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Conventional wisdom regarding the success of a project in the en-
tertainment industry is usually summed up in four words: "It's a crap
shoot." While an investor should be entitled to know who is going to
throw the dice and whether they will be tossed on a green felt table or a
hard concrete back alley, what the shooter ate for breakfast is irrelevant.
Similarly, the securities laws regulating direct investment in stage and
screen productions often focus on disclosing the nourishment of the crap-
shooter and not on the crapshooter's skill with the dice. As a result of
having to comply with irrelevant and excessive securities regulations, the
promoters spend more time and money to complete their financing with-
out providing any corresponding benefit to their investors.
In more prosaic terms, direct film and theater investments are
unique. The public is the consumer of plays and movies, spending discre-
tionary income to purchase emotion; anything from laughter, tears, vica-
rious thrills, to mental stimulation. The cost to the consumer, often
more than just the price of admission,1 includes the cost of transporta-
tion, parking, child care, and food. Public taste, the ultimate arbiter, is
often unpredictable.
Word-of-mouth is the great mystery factor ... of the distribution pro-
cess. No one knows exactly what it is, other than the all important
ingredient in making a film a hit or a bomb. It's that serendipitous
convergence of a great film, industry enthusiasm, an effective, well-
handled campaign by a sympathetic distributor, favorable press atten-
tion, and a strategic release not undercut by competitive challengers or
bad weather. Above all, word-of-mouth means a "buzz" about a par-
ticular film, derived from early [enthusiastic] viewers who will talk it
up and encourage others to come out and spend money to see it. When
you've got it, you've got a hit.
2
Despite the uncertainties, an investor must predict, usually a year or two
in advance, what combination of ingredients is likely to satisfy the pub-
lic's taste. If the investor is wrong, the product invested in has little or
no residual value.3 A play that closes on opening night cannot be sold at
a discount on the "used play market."
1. The top price for a Broadway musical in 1991 reached one hundred dollars for the
best seats to Miss Saigon. Rich, 'Miss Saigon,' From the Old School, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12
1991, 31 at BI, col. 3.
2. D. ROSEN & P. HAMILTON, OFF-HOLLYWOOD: THE MAKING AND MARKETING OF
AMERICAN SPECIALTY FILMS 323 (1986).
3. A film that fails to attract a ticket buying audience to the movie theater may still
recoup some or all of its costs through subsequent markets including video cassette, pay cable
television, and free television (cable and broadcast). A failed stage production has very few
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At a time when the major studios are being merged into interna-
tional entertainment conglomerates,4 funding for independent film pro-
ductions is severely impacted by two factors. First, investors are skittish
about recession and are reluctant to take risks.' Second, the fallout in
the independent distribution business is likely to get worse before it gets
better.6 A number of independent film production and distribution com-
panies have fallen on hard times in the last few years. Some have been
restructured and are barely hanging on, while others are out of business
or in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy.7 Bad management, underfunding, lack of
hit projects,' and increased difficulty in persuading investors to back in-
dependent productions are just a few reasons suggested for the hard
times facing film producers.9
B. Reasons to Invest
In good times or bad, lay investors are just as likely to pick the hits
as are distributors or studio heads. As Butch Cassidy and the Sundance
Kid screenwriter William Goldman stated, "No one person in the entire
motion-picture field knows for a certainty what's going to work."1 He
summarized this truism as, "Nobody knows anything."11
As a result of the speculative nature of these investments, investors
are motivated by more than pure economics. 2 Certainly the profit mo-
tive is a factor, but a belief in the premise and personality of a proposed
alternative sources of revenue, although in rare instances the licensing of subsidiary rights may
provide some revenue. See generally id.
4. Brennan, Big Deal, Hollywood, in DAILY VARIETY 57TH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE 14
(1990). Examples of recent or pending mergers are Sony/Columbia, Paramount Communica-
tions Corp./Capital Cities-ABC, and MCA/Matsushita. Id
5. Id.
6. Daniels, Making Cents, in DAILY VARIETY 56TH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE 113 (1989).
7. Lieberman, Backs to the Wall; Indies Running Hard to Stay in Place, Daily Variety,
Feb. 28, 1990, at F22, cols. 1, 3-4. Among the companies in trouble at this time are Atlantic
Entertainment Group, De Laurentiis Entertainment Group, New Visions Entertainment
Corp., New Star Entertainment Inc., Cineplex Odeon Corp., Zoetrope Productions, Vestron
Inc., and Spectrafilm. Id. at F22, cols. 4-5; F26, col. 4; F28, cols. 3-5; F30, col. 5; F32, col. 2.
8. Id. at F22, col. 4.
9. McBride, Indies, Daily Variety, Jan. 5, 1990, at 55, col. 1.
10. W. GOLDMAN, ADVENTURES IN THE SCREEN TRADE 39 (1983).
11. Id. A recent example of "nobody knows anything" was Warner Brothers' decision to
pass on Home Alone in favor of Bonfire of the Vanities. Periscope: Conventional Wisdom
Watch, Hollywood Studio Edition, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 14, 1991, at 4. As of Feb. 20, 1991,
Home Alone had domestic ticket sales of over $230 million while Bonfire had earned less than
$16 million. Film Boxoffice Report Weekend of Feb. 1-3, Daily Variety, Feb. 5, 1991, at 4, col.
2; Film Boxoffice Report Weekend of Feb. 15-18, Daily Variety, Feb. 20, 1991, at 4, col. 2.




film, coupled with the excitement of being involved in show business, are
just as important.
13
In this regard, theater investments are no different than film invest-
ments. As one experienced producer/investor said, "The use of the word
investor is specious. You don't invest in Broadway shows as you would
invest in a mutual fund. You invest in Broadway shows as you would in
a crap game or a horse race."' 4 Investors willing both to speculate and
to support an idea or an artist have been dubbed "angels." And some-
times angels get golden wings. For example, the profits from the New
York City run of A Chorus Line---excluding road shows and movie
sales--exceeded $18,000 for each $1,000 invested.' 5 Movie profits can be
even more spectacular because production costs remain constant once a
film is complete.
C. Typical Investment Vehicles
Typically, an individual investment in a production is made through
a limited partnership. A general partner with unlimited liability manages
the partnership. Those who contribute capital (the limited partners)
have no right to participate in management and assume no liability be-
yond the potential loss of their investment. 16 Motion picture limited
partnerships, and to a lesser extent theater partnerships, can be divided
into two categories: single project deals and portfolio or "blind pool"
partnerships.' 7 The latter are exemplified by the Silver Screen Partner-
ships, which raised almost one billion dollars in four programs financing
a slate of Disney films.' 8 Typically, these big portfolio partnerships are
designed to be eight- to ten-year investments, are affiliated with a major
studio, and have minimized the down side risk,' 9 often at the expense of
the upside profit potential.20 Limited partners invest, for the most part,
in blind pools. For example, investors set up Silver Screen Partners IV to
13. M. WIESE, THE INDEPENDENT FILM & VIDEOMAKERS GUIDE 10 (1984).
14. Rothstein, supra note 12, § 2, at 1, col. 1. (quoting producer/investor Arthur Cantor).
15. Id.
16. BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 336 (2d ed. 1984).
17. Blind pools are nonspecified productions.
18. Film Partnerships, THE STANGER REGISTER, Oct. 13, 1988, at 3. Silver Screen Part-
ners is an investment group which finances film productions. Some of the films financed by
Silver Screen Partners II and Silver Screen Partners III are as follows: Down and Out in
Beverly Hills, The Great Mouse Detective, The Color of Money, Benji the Hunted, Can't Buy Me
Love, Good Morning, Vietnam, and Tin Men. SILVER SCREEN IV, PROSPECTUS 17-18 (Feb.
22, 1988) (brochure accompanying the prospectus) (for a copy write to limited Partnership
Operations, 17 Battery Place, 17th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10004).
19. The downside risk is the loss of all or most of the invested capital.
20. Pender, Small Investors Bet on Big Movies, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 21, 1989, at
Cl, col. 3. Upside profit potential affords the investor an opportunity to share in any and all
profits without any significant limitations.
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finance as many as thirty-six feature films from Disney, but only four
films were actually identified in the prospectus.2"
This Note focuses primarily on the smaller type of limited partner-
ship22 in which investors know the name and nature of the film or play,
and invest, at least in part, because they believe in the quality, com-
merciality, or both of that project. Because these projects tend to be one-
shot deals, their life span is typically shorter than eight to ten years, and
their value can be measured on an artistic rather than a purely economic
scale. In other words, investors in Les Miserables would be more likely
to judge their potential return on the basis of the script and the reputa-
tion of the producer or stars, whereas investors in Silver Screen IV
would be more likely to evaluate the Walt Disney Company's reputation
as a corporate entity.
II
Problem: Generic Securities Regulations
A. Traditional Standards
No matter what the form of the limited partnership, the general
partner is selling securities.23 Consequently, the securities regulations of
individual states, the federal government, or both must be satisfied.24 The
problem is that these regulations are not tailored to stage and screen in-
vestments and, as a result, do not serve the investor, the syndicator, or
the government.25 This Note proposes some solutions to this problem.
The federal government and states have registration requirements
for security sales.26 The federal registration requirements are adminis-
tered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), while the
states' registration requirements are administered by various regulatory
21. SILVER SCREEN IV, supra note 18. The four films identified were Beaches, The Good
Mother, Fugitives, and The Little Mermaid. Id.
22. Theatrical investments are not always made through limited partnerships, but the
guidelines proposed herein may be analogized to financings made through other business enti-
ties. See generally Proposed NASAA Guidelines for Theatrical Production Syndications, 15 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 372 (Feb. 18, 1983).
23. See Sobel, Financing the Production of Theatrical Motion Pictures, 5 ENT. L. RPTR. 3,
9 (1984). Generally, a security is an investment contract "under which one invests money in a
common enterprise with the expectation of deriving a return primarily through the efforts of
others." H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 38 (1989).
24. Sobel, supra note 23, at 9.
25. 3 D. FARBER, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY CONTRACTS § 131.01 [3] (1989).
26. See NORTH AMERICAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION, PROTECTING
THE INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS (undated pamphlet) [hereinaf-
ter PROTECTING CAPITAL MARKETS]. See generally id., at 4-5. See also H. BLOOMENTHAL,
supra note 23, § 1.01.
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bodies established to enforce "blue sky laws." '27 Both the SEC and the
Securities Act of 193328 (the Act) were created by Congress in response
to the stock market crash of 1929. The basic policy behind the Act is
"full disclosure."29 This requires the issuer of the securities to reveal
completely the terms of the offering and the associated risks.30 While it
is incumbent upon the purchaser to evaluate these risks, the antifraud
provisions of the Act hold the issuer liable for failure to state any mate-
rial factor or to make any misleading statement.3' Many states also re-
quire "merit review," which gives the state's security regulator the
responsibility of evaluating new issues under a "fair, just, and equitable"
standard.32 This standard has generated controversy because of the vast
amount of discretion lodged in the merit administrator, the inherent sub-
jectivity of the standards, and the paternalistic nature of this regulatory
technique.33 The primary goal of registration is to "directly affect eco-
nomic behavior, and not just the disclosure of information about that
behavior."
34
There are a number of exemptions from registration requirements,
the common conditions for each form of exemption generally include a
limitation on the total capitalization, the number of investors, or both
(usually allowing a maximum of thirty-five unaccredited investors), and a
prohibition against general solicitation and advertising.35
B. Public Offerings and Private Placements
Both film and theater productions require significant capital. An
average Broadway musical costs between $5 million and $10 million to
produce.36 The average independently financed feature film, while signif-
icantly less costly than the major studios' 1990 per picture average of
nearly $27 million,37 is also a multimillion dollar proposition. An exami-
nation of the mathematics of a multimillion dollar exempt offering dem-
27. See PROTECTING CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 26. Blue sky laws are the state
registration of securities offerings. The name derives from speculative schemes "which had no
more basis than a square foot of Kansas blue sky. Kansas was the first state to use its own laws
to register securities." Id. at 4.
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988); PROTECTING CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 26.
29. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1354 (6th ed. 1990).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988).
31. Campbell, An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L.
553, 575-76 (1985). The antifraud statutes are codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1988).
32. See generally H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 23.
33. Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation and the Allocation of Regulatory Responsibilities,
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN SECURITY REGULATION 103, 134 (1988).
34. Id. at 121.
35. See Campbell, supra note 31, at 560.
36. Rothstein, supra note 12.
37. Eller, Costs Deflate H'W'D's Inflated B.O., Daily Variety, Feb. 6, 1991, at 1, col. 4.
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onstrates that, by definition, it is available only to the very wealthy. For
example, a $6 million Broadway musical subscribed to by a maximum of
thirty-five investors requires an average investment of approximately
$171,000 each. Very few investors have that kind of money available to
risk on a single production. The limits placed on promoters' general so-
licitation and advertising activities make it hard to reach even those few
investors who do have significant risk capital.
Those investors who can afford to take big risks are not protected.
Because private placements are not subject to review, the quality and
accuracy of the disclosure made by such private offerings vary widely
and are susceptible to abuse by a fraudulent general partner.38
On the other hand, public offerings, such as Silver Screen, have prof-
ited from an ability to solicit investments starting at $5,000 from a broad-
based audience.39 While such public offerings are reviewed by numerous
regulators, they have suffered from a different set of problems. As noted,
the nature of the big public partnerships is such that investors rarely, if
ever, know which productions they are investing in. Moreover, these
partnerships are structured in such a way that investors trade away the
chance to make big profits in return for minimized downside risk.'
C. Ill-Fitting Regulations
A promoter who wishes to make a single, identifiable production
available to investors in affordable amounts must comply with the public
offering requirements of the SEC or the states in which the securities are'
offered.4 ' Compliance brings its own set of problems: generic or irrele-
vant registration requirements that were created to test the merits of
more traditional kinds of investments, such as real estate and oil and gas
partnerships.42 The more traditional investments are generally long
term, rely on continuing management, and are susceptible to financial
and market analysis. Consequently, the disclosure requirements focus on
these items. Plays and movies, on the other hand, are short term, rely on
directors, stars, and crews hired for brief periods of time, and by their
very nature are unpredictable.43 Many of these regulations are not
38. While exempt transactions need not be registered, intentional misstatements or omis-
sions of fact constitute federal criminal violations. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1988).
39. See SILVER SCREEN IV, supra note 18, at 2.
40. See generally id.
41. See Sobel, supra note 23, at 9. "In fact, it is virtually certain that many if not most
producers who place ads for investors in the trade papers inadvertently violate securities laws
by doing so." Id.
42. See, e.g., Real Estate Programs, North Am. Sec. Admin. Ass'n. Rep. (CCH) 3601
(1991).
43. See Rothstein, supra note 12.
1991)
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designed to elicit information that would be particularly useful to an in-
vestor in plays and movies. For instance, audited balance sheets of the
partnership are required for an SEC registered offering." Yet, most
plays and movies are start-up ventures that have no financial history. A
potential investor is better off reading a script than a balance sheet, be-
cause financial history is not a predictor of box office success.
Almost every state has its own discrete registration requirements.
In some states, such as Colorado and Nevada, there are blanket exemp-
tions for SEC-registered offerings and require no state review whatso-
ever.45 Other jurisdictions, such as Illinois and Connecticut, review only
the adequacy and accuracy of the disclosure,46 in effect placing their faith
in Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis' noted phrase: "[S]unlight
is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient po-
liceman."47 Merit regulation states apply the strictest scrutiny; their
"blue-sky" laws give their regulators the authority to review both the
substantive merits of the offering as well as the completeness of the dis-
closure.48 Some feel that these blue-sky laws are "ineffective, philosoph-
ically unsound, and unnecessarily expensive," and that they should be
substantially eliminated.49 An opposing viewpoint is held by the North
American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), which rep-
resents most state securities administrators and attempts to provide in-
vestor protection and uniform regulation of securities through the use of
uniform registration forms and examinations.50 As explained below,
,these forms are in large part irrelevant to a stage or screen partnership.
Thus, there is a need for an alternative.
This writer was the general partner of an SEC-registered limited
partnership formed to finance the production of one modest budget fea-
ture film, The River Why.5 1 In "blue skying" the partnership in thirteen
states, the author was mandated to fulfill a variety of requirements. For
example, the states of Michigan and Washington required cross referenc-
ing to NASAA Real Estate Partnership Guidelines because the adminis-
trators in the two states feel that these guidelines were the most
44. Campbell, supra note 31, at 558.
45. See Sargent, supra note 33, at 112.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 115 (quoting L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANK-
ERS USE IT 92 (1914)).
48. Id. at 112-13.
49. Campbell, supra note 31, at 553.
50. PROTECTING CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 26, at 2-3.
51. The River Why, based on David James Duncan's novel of the same name, did not
receive adequate funding and was never produced.
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analogous to film. The guidelines, as they appear in the NASAA Reports,
are reproduced on the next page.
While some of the items are relevant to film and theater partner-
ships, many clearly are not. For example, items requiring information
about construction, property management fees, appraisals, and mortgage
loans have no bearing on the merits of a film. Moreover, the NASAA
Guidelines, either alone or in combination with specific state provisions,
can lead to substantial changes in the basic terms of the offering.2 This
is most apparent in relation to the profit split between the general and
limited partners in a theatrical syndication. The traditional split has
been fifty-fifty after the limited partners have recouped their investment,
with the general partner's share subject to dilution by profit incentives
offered to key players.5 3 By sharp contrast, the NASAA Real Estate
Guidelines provide for the promoter to receive less than twenty-five per-
cent of the profits, which is usually paid after a preferred return to inves-
tors.54 Thus, by applying irrelevant or non-traditional standards, a state
administrator will either force promoters to comply with the standards
or to withdraw their offering from that particular state.
Not only are investors not protected by these disclosure require-
ments, but they are also actually disadvantaged because the cost of com-
pliance is inevitably passed to them. The result is increased costs per
investment unit without corresponding benefits."
Beyond the increased cost associated with complex compliance stan-
dards is "the risk that an issuer will inadvertently violate a state's
laws." 6 Both the attorney and the accountant assisting with a public
offering run substantial liability and malpractice risks, since they must
provide signed opinions stating that the offering complied with appropri-
ate regulations.5 7 Some commentators have concluded that the millions
52. See Sargent, supra note 33, at 120-21.
53. See Sobel, supra note 23, at 8. Typically, the major stars, director, and writer are given
a share of the profits as part of their compensation package. Traditionally, this share has come
from the general partner, thus leaving the limited partners with an undiluted 50% of the prof-
its. The advantage to the limited partners is that they know up front what their profit share
will be. Id.
54. For example, an investor might be guaranteed a 110% return on invested capital
before the general partner receives any profit. "Real Estate Guidelines Cross Reference
Sheet," Real Estate Programs, North Am. Sec. Admin. Ass'n Rep. (CCH) 3610 (1991).
55. See Sargent, supra note 33, at 136 n.142.
56. See Campbell, supra note 31, at 562.
57. Malpractice insurance premiums can more than double the cost of protection for pro-
fessionals involved in public offerings. For example, the Cal Accountants Mutual Insurance
Co. recently raised the malpractice premiums for certified public accountants (CPAs) doing
SEC work. Where previously there had been a 25% surcharge, there is now a $2,500 fee per
engagement with an annual cap of $10,000. This means that an independent CPA whose










6. Asset based fee




11. Cash available for distribution
12. Cash flow
13. Competitive real estate commission
14. Construction fee




19. Investment in properties
20. Major repairs and rehabilitation
21. Mandatory deferred payments
22. Net worth
23. Non-specified property programs
24. Organization and offering expenses
25. Participant
28. Program interest
29. Program management fee
30. Property management fee
32. Purchase price
33. Specified property program
34. Sponsor
II. Requirements of Sponsors
A. Experience
B. Net worth




III. Suitability of the Participant
A. Standards
C. Maintenance of records
IV. Fees-Compensation-Expenses
B. Organization & offering expenses
C. Investment in properties
D. Program management fee
E. Promotional interest
2. a. Interest in cash available for distribution
b. Interest in sale or refinancing proceeds
* Reproduced from "Real Estate Guidelines Cross Reference Sheet," Real Estate
Programs, North Am. Sec. Admin. Ass'n Rep. (CCH) 3601 (1991).
Editors note. the guidelines above appear exactly as they do in the reporter.
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of dollars spent each year to comply with blue-sky laws actually retard
capital formation and provide no significant investor protection.58 This
conclusion is even more appropriate for stage and screen offerings. As-
suming a finite amount of investment capital is available, such capital
will provide a higher return to an investor if it is put to work creating
production value instead of complying with regulations that are designed
to protect real estate investors.
D. The New York Model
Investors need protection. They are entitled to make informed
choices, to be shielded from unscrupulous promoters, and to have access
to fairly structured deals. New York is the only state that regulates thea-
ter investors,59 utilizing the Theatrical Syndication Financing Act.'
The New York Legislature held hearings in the early 1960s that re-
vealed serious abuses in the methods of raising funds and accounting for
live theatrical productions. 61 Additionally, the hearings uncovered irreg-
ularities such as kickbacks and box office scalping.62 The theatrical com-
munity concluded that these abuses had resulted in a decline of
productivity and investor confidence. 63 The legislature responded with
bills now encompassed in sections twenty-three and twenty-five of the
Arts and Cultural Affairs Law (the N.Y. Law).' The N.Y. Law requires
1) that production companies provide accurate and periodic accountings;
2) that offering circulars make full disclosure; and 3) that funds be kept
in special bank trust accounts, and not be commingled or expended until
used for pre-production or production. It also prohibits deceptive or un-
true statements in the offering circular, and kickbacks.65
While there are several forms of offerings and exemptions depending
on the scope of the offering, the regulations regarding front money66 and
to more than $8,000 simply by engaging two SEC clients. Telephone interview with Dan
Jordan, CPA, Jordan & Decker (Mar. 3, 1990).
58. See Campbell, supra note 31, at 579.
59. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 23.08, 23.23 (McKinney Supp. 1989) (citing to
supplementary Practice Commentary).
60. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 23.01-.23 (McKinney 1983).





65. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 22.03, 23.97, 23.08, 23.19 (McKinney 1983).
66. Front money is used to obtain elements that make up the package to be offered to
investors, such as rights to a play and the offering documents. D. FARBER, PRODUCING THE-
ATER 116 (1981).
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workshop productions67 are minimal. 68 The content requirements for of-
fering literature include some disclosures specifically related to theatrical
syndications such as precise definitions of net profits and profit participa-
tions by actors. The N.Y. Law gives broad enforcement powers to the
Attorney General, which include unique subpoena powers and the right
to simultaneously pursue civil and criminal proceedings. 69  The N.Y.
Law does not apply to motion picture or television productions and is
limited to New York financings.70 Offerings made to out-of-state resi-
dents must comply with applicable SEC and Blue Sky regulations.7'
III
Solution
A variation on the N.Y. Law should be developed and applied to
both federal and state securities regulations. Ironically, the Theatrical
Syndications Guidelines Committee of the NASAA proposed guidelines
for theatrical production syndications in 1983.72 The guidelines, which
would have adopted the N.Y. Law almost in its entirety, were never ap-
proved.73 Despite NASAA's failure to adopt the N.Y. Law there re-
mains substantial cultural and economic justification for creating new
guidelines and broadening them to include film and video.
A. Public Policy
There are several public policies that justify special treatment for
theater and film. Article I of the United States Constitution is the start-
ing point for such justification. It states, "The Congress shall have
Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts ....
When Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1909, the legislative report
noted that copyrights are given in order to benefit the public and to stim-
67. Workshop productions are performed in small noncommercial settings, often without
major stars, in order to develop the play to Broadway standards.
68. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. ArT. LAW § 23.07 (McKinney 1983).




72. NASAA Proposes Guidelines for Theatrical Syndications, 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 353 (Feb. 18, 1983).
73. Telephone interview with Lee Poison, General Counsel of NASAA (Mar. 2, 1990).
Mr. Poison revealed two reasons for abandonment of the plan: 1) Theatrical syndications were
not part of the market for most states, and 2) there were objections to the compensation provi-
sions for the promoters because the amount was so much higher than for promoters of more
mainstream offerings. Id.
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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ulate writing and invention. 75 In general, both federal and state govern-
ments support the arts, but most of this support goes to the non-profit
sector in the form of direct grants.76 Favorable regulatory and tax con-
siderations could go a long way towards supporting profit-motivated ar-
tistic endeavors.
A second argument for special treatment for theater and film in-
volves the Securities Act of 1933.7' The Act already allows special treat-
ment for some industries. Railroads, educational and charitable
organizations, and other industries-that the government wished to pro-
mote at the time the Act was passed-were exempted from all or part of
the regulations.78 This is in keeping with President Franklin Roosevelt's
message to Congress when he proposed the legislation. Roosevelt said
"The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the public with the
least possible interference to honest business."7 9
Most states have established public policies favoring the arts.80 For
Example, the N.Y. Law begins with the following declaration of policy:
"The maintenance and well-being of the legitimate theatre in this state is
essential to the cultural, moral, and artistic well-being of the people of
the state."8" The financial incentives to a state may also have some effect.
Almost every state has some form of film office designed to attract film
and video production. 2 The state benefits from having such production
due to increased employment, income and other tax revenues, an eco-
nomic "multiplier effect,"'8 3 and the promotion of a "clean" industry. 4
75. A. LATMAN, R. GORDON & J. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 14 (3d ed.
1989).
76. For example, the National Endowment for the Arts and the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting.
77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988).
79. S. REP. No. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933).
80. See generally THE STRATEGIC PLAN FOR INCREASING FILM PRODUCTION IN ORE-
GON, A REPORT TO GOVERNOR NEIL GOLDSCHMIDT, at Appendix C (Sept. 1988) (to obtain
a copy, write Economic Development Department, 595 Cottage St., NE Salem, Oregon 97310)
[hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN]. In addition to the states, some countries have established poli-
cies favoring the arts. For example, Canada and Australia have supported their film industry
by offering significant tax advantages to investors. See STRATEGIC PLAN, supra.
81. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 23.01 (McKinney 1983).
82. See generally OREGON FILM COMEBACK TASK FORCE, THE STRATEGIC PLAN FOR
INCREASING FILM PRODUCTION IN OREGON, A REPORT TO GOVERNOR NEIL GOLD-
SCHMIDT (1988).
83. Id. at 49-50. Each dollar of new spending creates more than a dollar of total income.
For example, a film company pays for hotel rooms for its cast. The hotel purchases labor,
goods, and services with that income. The hotel employee spends his salary on labor, goods
and services. The multiplier effect can range from 1.7 to 3.6 times the actual dollars spent. Id.
84. Id. Film and theater are nonpolluting, create skilled jobs, and tend to be countercycli-
cal to an industrial economy. Id. at 50-51.
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The economic incentive to the federal government is similar, with the
added factor that film industry exports make a substantial contribution
to a favorable balance of payments.8 5 In 1989, the American film indus-
try earned revenues from abroad of $503 billion. In 1990, the industry
had a $3.5 billion favorable balance of payments.
8 6
B. Proposal
With the cultural, artistic, and economic justifications seemingly be-
yond dispute, this Note proposes simplified syndication guidelines for
stage and screen that have the following attributes:
1) A focus primarily on single or "fully-identified" multiple
productions.
Blind pools should be excluded from consideration because their
investors concentrate on the management team and organization
rather than on the merits of a specific production. Moreover, disclo-
sure concerning the specific budgets, personnel, and profit participa-
tions of a blind pool must be so vague as to be ineffective. Further, the
very large public partnerships such as Silver Screen are more amenable
to evaluation under traditional securities laws. The proposed laws
should be motivated more by product and less by high finance.
2) Disclosure requirements tailored to the industry.
Guidelines that serve both theater and film productions could eas-
ily be established based on the New York model. By adding a series of
definitions relating to film distribution and specifying limits on self
dealing in this regard, the N.Y. Law (and these proposed guidelines)
could easily encompass film production.8 7  Adding film as a compo-
nent might make a variation of the 1983 NASAA theatrical syndica-
tion proposal more acceptable to state administrators because the
market for film partnerships is much broader based than theatrical
offerings.8 8
3) Maximum selling commissions, 9 offering costs,9° and maxi-
mum producer profit share based on the current New York
guidelines.
91
This would insure that any offering to investors was "fair" in that
it would conform to film and theater industry norms. Promoters
85. Tusher, Balance of Payments Hits $3.5 Bil; Valenti Vows to Expand Biz, Contain
Piracy, Daily Variety, Jan. 9, 1991, at 1, col. 4.
86. Balance of payments for the film industry is third highest in the United States behind
agriculture and avionics. Id. at 41, col. 1.
87. The major distinction between a film and a theater project is in the distribution of the
product. A play has ongoing running costs for theater rentals, box office, and cast and crew.
In effect, the producer creates and distributes a play simultaneously. A film is produced first
and distributed thereafter. Distribution is often done by an entity unrelated to the producer.
The distributor handles the "running costs" and remits a royalty to the production company.
See Rothstein, supra note 12.
88. See generally THE STANGER REGISTER, supra note 18.
89. The commission paid to a broker-dealer for finding investors.
90. The legal, accounting, and printing costs associated with an offering.
91. The profit payable to the promoter after the break even point.
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should be required to disclose the names and resumes of the key crea-
tive personnel with their contractual status listed in all cases. Where
no contracts exist, but letters of intent92 or other expressions of interest
have been made, the exact nature of these commitments should be
listed. Disclosure of the names, experience, and levels of commitment
of key players provides an offeree valuable information by which to
evaluate the merits of an investment. In some instances these players
are the major asset of the production.
A producer who has only suggested casting, should be required to
disclose the actors' "prices" in the offering circular so that a potential
investor might evaluate the figures in terms of the proposed budget.
This would help to eliminate the practice of falsely promising big name
stars in small time productions.93 Additionally, the personnel section
of the offering should be easily amendable so that changes in an actor's
schedule necessitating a replacement could be disclosed quickly and
efficiently. Similarly, the exact contractual status of the underlying lit-
erary and musical properties should be disclosed.
4) Standard definitions of gross and net profits for a uniform dis-
closure procedure.
This would permit an investor to evaluate two offerings side by
side to determine potential rewards based on similar gross receipts.
Likewise, a standard pro forma income projection 94 should be devel-
oped. While projections are not particularly helpful because of the
public taste factor noted above, an investor should have the opportu-
nity to evaluate potential returns based on the real returns of other
films or plays. These figures, both good and bad, should be developed
and updated annually by industry groups, such as the Independent
Feature Project (IFP)95 or The League of American Theatres and
Producers.
9 6
Specific attention should be given to the unique financial practices
of stage and film producers. Among these practices are the use of
deferments97 by cast, crew, and equipment suppliers. While these
deferments should be encouraged, a standard method of disclosing
them and their possible effect on investor returns should be developed.
92. A letter of intent is a brief, usually nonbinding, writing that demonstrates the willing-
ness of an actor, for example, to participate in a production once it has been funded.
93. Unscrupulous promoters have been known to orally promise the participation of a
well-known actor in a low budget film, knowing that the actor's usual fee is much more than
the budget can handle. See, e.g., CHARIOT ENTERTAINMENT, PRIVATE PLACEMENT MEMO-
RANDUM (Oct. 1, 1988) (proposed casting for two movies with combined budgets of $3 million
included Jack Lemmon, Debra Winger, and James Woods). While famous actors often do
participate in small films, they do it because they believe in the project and consequently will
often allow their names to be used in writing.
94. An accounting based on hypothetical figures. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1091
(5th. ed. 1979).
95. IFP is an organization devoted to promoting quality American independent films.
MONTAGE, June 1988, at 2, col. 1.
96. The organization that represents mainstream (Broadway) producers.
97. "A deferment is a contingent but fixed sum of money payable only from gross receipts
prior to the payment of net profits." P. BAUMGARTEN & D. FARBER, PRODUCING, FINANC-
ING AND DISTRIBUTING FILM 46 (1973). For example, an actor might agree to accept 50% of
his salary only after the investors reached breakeven.
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Formal provisions should also be adopted disclosing the effects of go-
ing over budget and noting the possibilities for overcalls9s or the costs
(financial and artistic) and applicability of completion bonds.99
5) Modified accounting requirements that protect the investor at
a minimum cost.
Therefore, audited financial statements should be required only
where absolutely necessary. 1 ° While the N. Y. Law currently allows
for a waiver from strict accounting requirements for low budget pro-
ductions,10 1 the dollar threshold should be raised or eliminated in or-
der to reduce disproportionately high administrative costs.
6) A standard set of risk factors in addition to any that are spe-
cific to a given production.
Among these standard risks are the following: no operating his-
tory, general production and competition risks, restrictions on the
transfer of units, tax risks, and limited rights of participation in the
management of the partnership. Affirmative disclosure requirements
should match the risk factors so that a participant can begin to identify
what steps the producer has taken to counter these risks. Full audit
rights should be given to each investor.
As a tradeoff for this tailored procedure and simplified standard, the
New York provisions creating strong civil and criminal enforcement
powers102 should be adopted. 103 Presumably, producers would be willing
to accept heightened government scrutiny in return for a chance to at-
tract more investors through regulations created for the entertainment
industry.
98. Overcalls are additional amounts of capital which a participant may be required or
requested to contribute beyond his initial contribution.
99. Completion bonds are agreements by a bonding company to pay for the completion of
an over-budget movie or to repay the financiers in full. See Sobel, supra note 23, at 9.
100. A reviewed financial statement based on inquiry and analysis by an accountant gener-
ally costs less than half that of an audited financial statement, but from an investor's stand-
point makes no material difference. Telephone interview with Dan Jordan, CPA, Jordan &
Decker (Mar. 3, 1990).
101. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 23.08, 23.23 (McKinney Supp. 1989) (citing sup-
plementary Practice Commentaries). Currently, exemptions are possible for offerings of less
than $250,000, offerings made to 36 or fewer persons, or upon other grounds determined by
the attorney general. Id.
102. Id. The New York Attorney General has used these enforcement powers several
times. See, e.g., In re Abrams v. "John Anonymous" Esq., 62 N.Y.2d 183, 465 N.E.3d 1, 476
N.Y.S.2d 494 (1984).
103. It is beyond the scope of this Note, but it might be interesting to consider the effects of
the Attorney General's subpoena power on the accounting practices of film distributors.
Could film distributors' notorious ability to hide profits finally be scrutinized because of this
kind of legislation if, for instance, an investor appealed to the Attorney General to help him
discover why the return on a box office hit was so small? This might give an investor addi-
tional leverage in an Art Buchwald/Coming to America situation. Art Buchwald sued Para-
mount Pictures for his share of the net profits in the Eddie Murphy film, Coming to America.
Despite earning over $100 million Paramount claimed that no net profits were available be-
cause the film had not broken even. A Los Angeles Superior Court Judge ruled that the con-
tract was unconscionable and that Buchwald was entitled to a share of the profits. Buchwald
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497 (Super. Ct. of Cal., 1990).
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IV
Conclusion
Theater and film producers are hampered in their fund raising ef-
forts by inconsistent and irrelevant securities laws. At the same time,
investors are not protected adequately by the current disclosure require-
ments, which are costly and uninformative. Public policy in general, and
New York's practice in particular, support affirmative changes in this
situation. Uniform laws and guidelines specifically adapted to stage and
screen should be adopted by the SEC, NASAA, and the individual states.
The result could be a flourishing of the arts and a vast increase in that
band of investors known as "angels".

